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In his seminal address delivered in 1945 to the Royal Society Gilbert
Ryle considers a special case of knowing-how, viz., knowing how to
reason according to logical rules. He argues that knowing how to
use logical rules cannot be reduced to a propositional knowledge. We
evaluate this argument in the context of two different types of formal
systems capable to represent knowledge and support logical reasoning:
Hilbert-style systems, which mainly rely on axioms, and Gentzen-style
systems, which mainly rely on rules. We build a canonical syntactic
translation between appropriate classes of such systems and demonstrate
the crucial role of Deduction Theorem in this construction. This analysis
suggests that one’s knowledge of axioms and one’s knowledge of rules
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under appropriate conditions are also mutually translatable. However
our further analysis shows that the epistemic status of logical knowing-
how ultimately depends on one’s conception of logical consequence: if
one construes the logical consequence after Tarski in model-theoretic
terms then the reduction of knowing-how to knowing-that is in a
certain sense possible but if one thinks about the logical consequence
after Prawitz in proof-theoretic terms then the logical knowledge-
how gets an independent status. Finally we extend our analysis to
the case of extra-logical knowledge-how representable with Gentzen-
style formal systems, which admit constructive meaning explanations.
For this end we build a typed sequential calculus and prove for it a
“constructive” Deduction Theorem interpretable in extra-logical terms.
We conclude with a number of open questions, which concern translations
between knowledge-how and knowledge-that in this more general semantic
setting.
Table of Contents:
1 Knowing-How without Anti-Intellectualism 3
1.1 Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Rules and Sentences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Ryle on Knowing How To Reason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 Two Styles of Axiomatic Thought 7
2.1 Hilbert-Style . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Gentzen-Style . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Comparison of the Two Styles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4 Two Axiomatic Styles and the Debate on Knowing-How and
Knowing-That . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3 Translation between the two axiomatic Styles and the Deduction
Theorem 12
3.1 Hilbertian Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2 Deduction Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.3 Translating between the Two Styles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.4 Richer Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4 Reduction of Knowing-How to Knowing-That 17
2
4.1 Ryle on Carroll Paradox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.2 Further Objections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.3 Two Conceptions of Logical Consequence and Their Epistemological
Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5 Constructive Theories 22
5.1 Constructive Deduction Theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.2 Tacit Knowledge Revisited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.3 Which Rules are Logical? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6 Conclusion 26
1 Knowing-How without Anti-Intellectualism
1.1 Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism
In November 1945 Gilbert Ryle gave his Presidential Address to the Aristotelian
Society [24], which produced a wide epistemological debate about the concept
of knowledge-how. This continuing debate [4] has been recently summarized
in the following words:
There are two main camps in the debate about the constituent
concepts of knowledge-how. One camp, intellectualism, argues
that knowledge-how involves propositional knowledge [...], whereas
the competing camp argues that knowledge-how does not involve
propositional knowledge - a view called anti- intellectualism. According
to anti-intellectualists, whereas propositional knowledge is a certain
type of belief, knowledge-how consists in abilities, skills, or dispositions
[...]. ([10], p. 2930)
Even if the titles of intellectualism and anti-intellectualism are often used
in this debate as mere labels pointing to certain accounts of propositional
and non-propositional knowledge, the choice of these words is evidently not
arbitrary. Ryle calls the “intellectualist legend” an epistemological thesis that
all knowledge is knowledge-that, i.e., a knowledge of certain proposition or
class of propositions. He argues that this view of knowledge leaves aside
a sort of knowledge needed for various actions such as riding a bicycle or
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making logical inferences (more on this last example below), i.e., knowledge-
how. Ryle’s pejorative use of word “intellectualist” apparently has a social
motivation: intellectualists are people who know a lot but are incapable to
undertake an action.
1.2 Rules and Sentences.
As we shall now argue this Ryle’s terminological decision is not simply
unfortunate but reflects a genuine conceptual confusion, which continues to
affect the epistemological debate on knowing-how up to the present.
One issue, which is central in this debate, is the distinction between
knowing a proposition and knowing how to act. Another issue, which is also
widely discussed in the same debate, is the distinction between tacit and
explicit knowledge. The popular example of knowing how to ride a bicycle
instantiates both these features: it is a knowledge-how and it is tacit because
even an experienced rider usually cannot explain in words how she rides a
bicycle and cannot transfer this knowledge to another person by linguistic
means. Nevertheless it is wrong, we claim, to generalize upon this and similar
examples of knowing-how. The two aforementioned distinctions should be
analyzed separately. The title of “(anti)-intellectualism” reflects a confusion
of these two different distinctions as we shall briefly explain.
Here is an example of different sort, which has been considered by Ryle
in his original paper but attracted little attention in the later literature:
knowing how to reason logically. Ryle presents it via the following imaginary
dialogue:
[T]he intelligent reasoner is knowing rules of inference whenever
he reasons intelligently’. Yes, of course he is, but knowing such a
rule is not a case of knowing an extra fact or truth ; it is knowing
how to move from acknowledging some facts to acknowledging
others. Knowing a rule of inference is not possessing a bit of extra
information but being able to perform an intelligent operation.
Knowing a rule is knowing how. (The emphasis is added by the
authors.) ([24] p. 7).
What knowing a rule amounts to exactly is not an easy question. Clearly, a
law-like behavior of certain agency and moreover a law-like character of some
natural process is not a sufficient reason for attributing such a knowledge.
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One’s awareness about a rule is not a sufficient reason either because one
can be aware about a rule but be unable to follow it. But however these
and other related epistemological questions are settled, knowing a rule can,
and in our view should, be seen on a par with knowing a proposition. Thus
we have got here an example of knowing how, namely that of knowing
how to make logical inferences, which instantiates a sort of knowing-how
that admits a representation both in natural languages (in particular, in
the form of imperative sentences) and in symbolic logical calculi in the
form of syntactic rules. Clearly, logic is not the only domain where explicit
rules play a role. Explicit rules are abundant in games, social and political
life, technology and in many other domains. Knowledge of these rules and
capacity to apply them in most pragmatic contexts is at least as important
as propositional knowledge. Representation of knowing-how in the form of
rules and instructions is a way of making this knowledge explicit.
Thus the popular idea according to which knowledge-how has an intrinsic
tacit character is misleading. The distinction between explicit and tacit knowledge
is interesting and important on its own but it should not be systematically
confused with the distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that even if
some suggestive examples can be readily used for studying both these issues.
This is a reason why, in our view, the title of “anti-intellectualism”, which
refers to the allegedly tacit character of knowledge-how, is not an appropriate
name for the view according to which knowledge-how is epistemically significant
and not reducible to propositional knowledge
1.3 Ryle on Knowing How To Reason
A close reading of the following passage by Ryle shows how exactly he
mistakes the tacit character of knowing-how in some examples for its essential
property.
[A]rguing intelligently did not before Aristotle and does not after
Aristotle require the separate acknowledgment of the truth or
"validity"of the formula. "God hath not left it to Aristotle to
make (men) rational."Principles of inference are not extra premisses
and knowing these principles exhibits itself not in the recitation
of formula but in the execution of valid inferences and in the
avoidance, detection and correction of fallacies, etc. The dull
reasoner is not ignorant ; he is inefficient. A silly pupil may know
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by heart a great number of logicians’ formulae without being good
at arguing. The sharp pupil may argue well who has never heard
of formal logic. ([24], p. 7).
There are two different lines of argument here. One argument is that
• (i) “Principles of inference are not extra premisses and knowing these
principles exhibits itself not in the recitation of formula but in the
execution of valid inferences.”
It has two different parts (which I paraphrase according to my understanding
of Ryle):
• (ia) Rules of logical inference are not propositions.
• (ib) Knowing a rule of inference differs from knowing a proposition.
Knowing a rule is not a propositional attitude. It involves a capacity
to act according to this rule and detect violations of the rule.
The other argument is this:
• (ii) One can possibly be an efficient reasoner without knowing formal
logic. In other words, one’s knowledge how to reason in certain cases is
not based on knowing formal rules.
This last argument in different words is expressed in the first two and
in the last sentences of the quoted passage while the former arguments sits
in the middle. So Ryle mixes the two arguments without explaining how the
rule-based character of logical inference is related to the fact that it is possible
to follow certain rules without being aware of them. In the paragraph, which
follows the above quoted passage, Ryle briefly considers and rejects the view
according to which “the intelligent reasoner who has not been taught logic
knows the logicians’ formulae "implicitly "but not "explicitly ".” Ryle takes
it for granted that the assumption “ that knowledge-how must be reducible
to knowledge-that ” is a part of the above view and then famously dismisses
this view as a “intellectualist legend ”. For some reason Ryle simply does
not distinguish between the case when one reasons according to logical rules
without being aware about these rules and the case when one follows logical
rules intentionally and explicitly.
This analytic fallacy, which lies in the core of Ryle’s “anti-intellectualism”
and its more recent heirs, gave to the concept of knowledge-how its anti-
intellectual flavor which, in our view, it does not deserve.
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In the next two Sections we consider an explicit rule-based form of knowing-
how represented in the form of syntactic rules in symbolic logical calculi.
2 Two Styles of Axiomatic Thought
In this Section we introduce the standard informal distinction between the
so-called Hilbert-style and Gentzen-style symbolic calculi and then explain its
relevance to the epistemological debate on knowing-how and knowing-that.
A part of this presentation is made in the form of historical narrative.
2.1 Hilbert-Style
The standard modern notion of axiomatic theory stems from David Hilbert’s
seminal work in foundations of geometry [11]. The idea here is to generate
the intended theory T from a list of axioms Ai by inferring from the axioms
further propositions called theorems. More precisely, axioms in this setting
are propositional forms, which become full-fledged propositions under an
interpretation, which is an assignment to non-logical terms of Ai certain
semantic values borrowed from other theories or, less formally, simply from
the “world out there” (cf. Hilbert’s legendary suggestion to interpret the
Pythagorean theorem in terms of tables and beer mugs).
Hilbert’s 1899 work on foundations of geometry had an obvious drawback:
the logical part of his axiomatic method remained underdeveloped or perhaps
even not developed at all. This is a reason why in his famous lecture on
“Axiomatic Thought” given in 1917 Hilbert claims that
“[I]t appears necessary to axiomatize logic itself ” ([12] p. 1113)
and then pursues this project in his later work [13, 14]. In [13] Hilbert and
Ackerman consider a number of logical calculi presented via lists of axioms
(which in this case are logical tautologies) and syntactic rules, which generate
from the axioms further tautologies. In his later joint work with Bernays [14]
Hilbert applies this upgraded form of his axiomatic method in formal theories
of geometry and arithmetic. As Hintikka rightly observes Hilbert’s leap from
axiomatic theories of geometry and arithmetic to axiomatic theories of logic
was not innocent [15]. Nevertheless such a uniform approach to logical calculi
and non-logical theories makes part of the current informal idea of Hilbert-
style formal system.
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Hilbert never explicitly elaborated on the concept of logical inference
but it is plausible that at least in his most influential [11] he had in view
a prototype of the model-theoretic truth-conditional semantical concept of
logical consequence later made explicit by Alfred Tarski [27]:
Definition 1 Propositional form B is a logical consequence of propositional
forms A1, . . . , An iff every interpretation I of the given language, which makes
A1, . . . , An into true propositions AI1, . . . , AIn makes B into true proposition
BI , in symbols A1, . . . , An |= B.
Notice that this conception of logical consequence does not involve that of
rule. Under this view the syntactic rule A1, . . . , An ` B is viewed (granting its
soundness with respect to the given semantics) as a mere symbolic representation
the fundamental relation A1, . . . , An |= B. (After Go¨del’s works we know that
such a symbolic representation cannot be faithful, i.e., semantically complete,
in case of sufficiently strong theories including arithmetic.) Consequence
A |= B is conceived of here as a fact of the matter, which concerns all
possible interpretations of A and B. Rule A ` B under this view is nothing
but a symbolic trick, which allows one in appropriate circumstances to get a
grasp of this fact.
2.2 Gentzen-Style
In 1935 Hilbert’s associate Gerhard Gentzen published a paper [7] where he
argued that
The formalization of logical deduction, especially as it has been
developed by Frege, Russell, and Hilbert, is rather far removed
from the forms of deduction used in practice in mathematical
proofs. ([7], p. 68)
and proposed an alternative approach to syntactic presentation of deductive
systems, which involved relatively complex systems of rules and didn’t use
logical tautologies. In [7] Gentzen builds in this way two formal calculi known
as Natural Deduction and Sequent Calculus.
Gentzen’s remark quoted above constitute a pragmatic argument but
hardly points to an original epistemological view on logic and axiomatic
method. However his further remark that
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The introductions [i.e. introduction rules] represent, as it were,
the ’definitions’ of the symbol concerned. ([7], p. 80)
is seen today by some authors as an origin of an alternative conception of
logical consequence and alternative logical semantics more generally, which
has been developed in a mature form only in late 1999-ies or early 2000-
ies and is known today under the name of proof-theoretic semantics (PTS).
It is instructive to compare Gentzen’s idea to use syntactic rules as a form
of implicit definitions with Hilbert’s use of axioms as implicit definitions.
The two approaches may appear to be very similar but in fact they are not.
Think of usual axioms of Group Theory, which today are commonly used
in mathematical courses as the definition of the group concept in Algebra.
These axioms serve as a definition in the following sense: any structure, which
satisfy the axioms, i.e., serves as their model, is a group. Model theory, which
originates from Tarski’s pioneering works, explains away the satisfaction
relation in terms of truth-conditions. This is all well-known. But what kind
of entity X can possibly “satisfy” a rule or a system of rules, so one could
claim that the rules “define” X in some reasonable sense? How the satisfaction
relation (if it can be used here at all) has to be construed in this case?
Proof theoretic semantics provides some answers to these and other related
questions and develops new formal frameworks accordingly. For an overview
reflecting the present state of affairs in PTS the reader is referred to [25, 5, 20].
Here we provide only few remarks, which give a general idea, prevent the
reader from possible confusions and highlight some key features of PTS,
which are important for our following arguments.
• Proof Theory referred to in PTS is not the proof theory in Hilbert’s
sense of the word [14] where a proof is identified with a formal derivation
and then made into an object of a meta-mathematical study, but the
General Proof Theory (GPT) due to Dag Prawitz, where, by his word
“proofs are studied in their own right in the hope of understanding their
nature” [21, 22]. In more a recent paper Prawitz describes the difference
between the proof-theoretic and truth-conditional approaches to meaning
as follows:
[I]n contrast to a truth-conditional meaning theory, [in PTS]
one should explain the meaning of a sentence in terms of what
it is to know that the sentence is true, which in mathematics
amounts to having a proof of the sentence. ([20], p. 5-6).
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This quote points to a strong conceptual link between PTS, on the
one hand, and intuitionisitc and constructivist approaches in logic and
foundations of mathematics, on the other hand. We shall explore this
link in Section 5.
• PTS is motivated by a broad philosophical view on meaning (and hence
on semantics), which is conventionally called “meaning-as-use”. This
view on meaning goes back to Wittgenstein and more recently has been
defended and further systematically developed by Robert Brandom [2]
under the name of inferentialism. Since PTS is a formal semantical
approach the reference to “use” amounts here to referring to syntactic
rules, which specify the use of symbols and symbolic expressions in
logical calculi. Gentzen’s original insight according to which rules of
inference provide the semantic value of symbolic expressions is preserved
in all existing various versions of PTS.
• PTS is not denotational. It does not assign certain entities to certain
symbols. It assigns to symbols (and first of all to logical symbols, i.e., to
logical constants) their meaning, which is not construed in this case as
an entity. The procedure of such an assignment is called after Martin-
Lo¨f the meaning explanation and consists, roughly, of the explication of
computational content of logical constructions in terms of their building
blocks, which are presented in a self-explanatory canonical form [19].
• Historically the PTS approach has been motivated by the idea that
formal derivability (albeit not the existence of proof) and logical consequence
are the same. However there is a recent proposal according to which
these two things should be properly distinguished [6]. In what follows we
do not assume that under PTS formal derivation and logical consequence
are the same.
2.3 Comparison of the Two Styles
The difference between Hilbert-style and Gentzen-style formal systems is
usually described in the recent literature by saying that Hilbert-style systems
are typically presented by long lists of axioms or axiom schemes and only few
(typically one) rules, while Gentzen-style systems are presented by a small
(possibly empty) sets of axioms and long lists of rules; it is further said
that Hilbert-style systems “rely more on sets of axioms”, while Gentzen-style
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system “rely more on sets of rules” [29]. This is a very loose and informal
description - as are ways in which these titles are actually used in logicians’
professional parlance. In order to be in a position to study the two axiomatic
“styles” more rigorously we introduce in the next Section the concept of
(propositional) Hilbertian theory (Def. 11) which is more narrow than what
people may call a Hilbert-style propositional theory. We shall not provide a
complementary syntactic definition of Gentzen-style theory because in what
follows we use in its stead a general syntactic of symbolic calculus (Def. 2).
Since any axiom A can be straightforwardly read as a rule of form ` A with
the empty set of premises, at the syntactic level Gentzen’s approach is more
general than Hilbert’s. So we shall study the place of Hilbert-style theories
in this more general syntactic setting.
In this paper we do not develop formal semantic approaches but refer
to the two established conceptions of logical semantics mentioned above:
Tarski’s truth-conditional semantics and PTS. These semantic conceptions
do not depend directly on syntactic details. Nevertheless both for historical
and some technical reasons it is natural to associate the truth-conditional
semantics with Hilbert-style and PST with Gentzen-style. This decision can
be viewed as a way to make more precise the idea that Hilbert-style theories
“rely more on axioms” and Gentzen-style theories latter “rely more on rules”.
Such semantic assumptions, once again, are stronger that the current use
of titles “Hilbert-style” and “Gentzen-style” may suggest. Authors often use
these titles referring only to the syntax without any semantic commitment.
Our formal definitions in the next Section are also purely syntactic, so in the
formal part of the paper we don’t go against the common language. However
in the following epistemological discussion the semantic aspects of the two
axiomatic styles turn to be crucial.
2.4 Two Axiomatic Styles and the Debate on Knowing-
How and Knowing-That
To conclude this Section let us explain the relevance of the distinction between
the two styles of axiomatic thinking to the epistemological debate on knowledge-
how. It becomes clear from Ryle’s remark that knowing how to make a logical
inference amounts to knowing the corresponding rule of inference (“Knowing
a rule is knowing how”). We assume here that axiomatic theory T , generally,
represents a piece of knowledge; in other words, we assume that theory T can
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be known by an epistemic agent. Since T , generally, comprises propositions
(axioms and theorems) and rules of inference, we further assume that one’s
knowledge of T also splits, accordingly, into a propositional (knowledge-
that) and a procedural (knowledge-how) parts. Since every axiomatic theory
comprises at least one rule of inference (for otherwise it is not a theory but a
mere collection of statements) one’s knowledge of a theory always comprises
a procedural part. Since Hilbert-style theories comprise few rules and a lot
of axioms while Gentzen-style theories comprise few (or no) axioms and a
lot of rules, the procedural and the propositional knowledge are distributed
differently in the two cases. If one and the same axiomatic theory allows both
for Hilbert-style and Gentzen-style presentations then a study of translations
between these axiomatic presentations sheds a light on the issue of translatability
of procedural knowledge into a propositional form and vise versa. The question
of whether or not the procedural knowledge can in some reasonable sense be
wholly reduced to the propositional knowledge in a formal axiomatic setting
is treated in Section 4.
A disclaimer is here in order. In what follows we don’t try to formalize
knowledge-how in the same sense in which propositional knowledge-that is
formalized in various systems epistemic logics where knowledge of proposition
p is represented as a modal operator K applied to p. It is not clear to us
whether such a strategy can be used in the case of procedural knowledge and
we shall not attempt anything similar.
3 Translation between the two axiomatic Styles
and the Deduction Theorem
In this Section we study mathematically the issue of syntactic translatability
between Hilbert-style and Gentzen-style systems and highlight the role of
Deduction Theorem. This material is by and large standard but in the view
of our epistemological purpose we present it here in a more abstract form
than usual. Standard definitions are given in a semi-formal manner. We
begin with considering the case of propositional theories and finish with




Definition 2 Symbolic calculus comprises:
• alphabet of symbols;
• a set of words wi built with the alphabet;
• a set of rules ri of form wi, . . . , wk ` w, which derive word w from given
words wi, . . . , wk;
• set A (possibly empty) of axioms which are rules of special form ` w.
Definition 3 Propositional language is a calculus with a distinguished finite
set of symbols called connectives, which includes connective “→”; other symbols
are called propositional variables.
Definition 4 Propositional theory is a set T of formulae closed under application
of the standardmodus ponens (MP ) (other rules are allowed but not required).
Elements of T are called theorems of the given theory. The theory is called
axiomatic when it comprises a distinguished subset A ⊂ T of axioms such
that all theorems of T are derivable from the axioms via applications of MP .
The notion of derivation from a set Γ of hypotheses (denoted Γ `T F or
Γ ` F when there is no risk of confusion) is standard.
Definition 5 An axiomatic theory is called Hilbertian when it comprises as
theorems all formulae of the form KA,B and SA,B,C where
KA,B
.
= A→ (B → A)
SA,B,C
.
= (A→ (B → C))→ ((A→ B)→ (A→ C))
and has exactly one rule, namely MP .
3.2 Deduction Property
Definition 6 Theory T is said to have the Deduction Property (DP for
short) if Γ, F ` G entails Γ ` F → G for all Γ, F and G.
Before we proceed let us explain the relevance of the Deduction Property
to our main theme. We are interested to study this property because a theory
having this property allows one to “represent” (in a sense, which is made
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more precise in what follows) any of its rule A ` B by the implication
A → B, which is a proposition. It appears reasonable to assume that one’s
knowledge how to derive B from A is represented in this case, accordingly, by
the knowledge that A implies B. Our next Lemma shows that the concept
of Hilbertian theory and that of theory with Deduction Property are co-
extensional:
Lemma 7 An axiomatic propositional theory is Hilbertian if and only if it
has the Deduction Property.
Proof :
“⇒“ (the “only if” part). The standard proof of the Deduction Theorem
[16].
“⇐“ (the “if” part). By the definition of derivation in propositional theories
we have A,B ` A. Using the deduction property twice we get from the former
formula ` A → (B → A). Similarly, by using twice the deduction property
from A → (B → C), A → B, A ` C we get ` (A → (B → C)) → ((A →
B)→ (A→ C)). C
Lemma 7 says that the Deductive Property is not universal and should be
always expected, but a proper feature of Hilbertian theories (Definition 11)
which other propositional theories do not possess. Some examples of formal
systems without Deduction Property are discussed in Appendix 2.
3.3 Translating between the Two Styles
DP and Lemma 7 bear only onto the distribution of propositional and procedural
knowledge within a Hilbert-style axiomatic system - while our more general
goal is to understand how the procedural knowledge represented with a
Gentzen-style system may (or may not) translate into a Hilbert-style system
and vice versa. We warn the reader that at the time of writing we don’t
have the full answer to this question in the form of necessary and sufficient
conditions under which the two sorts of systems are mutually translatable
in a reasonable sense of the word. Below we present some partial results:
we show that Hilbertian theories allow for a canonical translation into a
sequential form (Lemma 9 below) and then specify a class of Gentzen-style
systems which canonically translate into Hilbertian theories (Lemma 10). We
need also a preliminary lemma:
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Lemma 8 All axiomatic propositional theories have the following property
(rule (→`)): if Γ ` F and Γ, G ` H then Γ, F → G ` H.
Proof :
Given the two above derivations form the following sequence of formulae:
Γ ` F , F → G, Γ, G ` H. The sequence qualifies as a derivation Γ, F →
G ` H. (Some formulae may enter into this sequence more than once but the
definition of derivation does not rule this possibility out.) C
From a Hilbertian theory to its sequential presentation:
Let T be a Hilbertian theory. Consider the following sequential calculus TG.
Sequences in TG are of form Γ⇒ F . Rules of TG comprise all structural rules
(axioms of form F ⇒ F , contraction, weakening and the cut rule). For each
axiom A of T there is the corresponding sequence⇒ A in TG. Finally TG has
the usual rules for implication, namely:
Γ⇒ F Γ, G⇒ H
(→⇒)
Γ, F → G⇒ H
Γ, F ⇒ G
(⇒→)
Γ⇒ F → G
Lemma 9 Γ ` F in theory T if and only if sequence Γ⇒ F is derivable in
TG.
Proof:
“⇒“ (the “only if” part): Induction by Γ ` F . If F is an axiom of T or




Γ, A⇒ A→ B
Γ, A⇒ A Γ, A,B ⇒ B
(→⇒)





“⇐“ (the “if” part): Translation that replaces all entries of ⇒ by ` is sound
with respect to all rules of TG. See Lemmas 7,8. C
From a sequent calculus to a Hilbertian theory:
15
Let sequent calculus TG contain all structural rules and rules (→⇒), (⇒→)
are admissible in TG. TG may also contain other rules. Consider set
T = {F | sequence⇒ F is derivable in TG}
Lemma 10 T is a propositional Hilbertian theory
Proof : Axioms are all formulae of T . SinceMP is admissible in TG, T is closed
with respect to MP . Formulae of forms (KA,B) and (SA,B,C) are elements of
T because sequences ⇒ KA,B and ⇒ SA,B,C are derivable using rule (⇒→)
and the structural rules. C
Lemma 9 tells us that a Hilbertian theory admits a translation into a
sequential Gentzen-style form, which preserves and reflects its deductive
properties. Lemma 10 says that a sufficiently strong sequent calculus admits
a translation into a Hilbertian theory.
3.4 Richer Systems
To conclude this Section we shall make few remarks about first-order and
modal extensions of propositional theories. The minimal setting where the
Deduction Theorem holds (i.e., which has the Deduction Property) is the
minimal logic ML, which comprises only one connective →, all axioms
KA,B;SA,B,C and one rule MP (compare Def. 11 above). So the question
whether or not in a given theory T has DP is the question of whether or not
T interprets ML. Hilbertian theories interpret ML fully and faithfully in the
sense that every derivation in T has a pre-image in ML. But if one adds to
MP some further rules then DP, generally, fails to hold as it happens, for
example, in various systems of modal logic. In some such cases DP can be
forced by an appropriate correction of additional rules. Thus the Deduction
Theorem can be proved for usual First-Order Logic if one uses a convention
according to which the usual rule of universal generalization with hypotheses
Γ ` P (x)
Γ ` ∀x.P (x)
applies only if Γ does not contain variable x in the free form. Without this
additional requirement DP fails to hold.
For these reasons the core content DP can be fully understood and studied
at the propositional level. Richer systems may have this property when they
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are used in a restricted form, which is essentially a way to emulate the
propositional reasoning in such systems. In Appendix 2 we give an example
of useful calculus without DP.
4 Reduction of Knowing-How to Knowing-That
In the last Section we have seen that Hilbertian theories are formal frameworks,
which allow for a smooth passage from Hilbert-style presentation to Gentzen-
style and (under appropriate conditions) vice versa. Does this property of
Hilbertian theories allow for a full “reduction” of knowing-how to knowing-
that? 1
At the first glance the answer appears to be negative because any axiomatic
theory deserving the name needs to comprise at least one rule (MP ) and
cannot reduce to a mere collection of propositions. Recall, however, that the
Tarskian semantic concept of logical consequence does not involve the concept
of rule. This allows one to think of rule A ` B (granting soundness of the
given theory with respect to its semantics) as a mere symbolic representation
of the fundamental fact that B is a logical consequence of A (i.e., A |= B),
which is fully explained in terms of truth-conditions. Indeed, formula A |= B
stands in this case for meta-theoretical proposition
(SCA|=B): All models of A are models of B,
which is obviously a proposition. Accordingly, knowledge of rule A ` B
reduces to knowledge of A |= B, which is propositional knowledge. This
completes a sketch of the wanted propositional reduction. Now we shall
discuss its details and reply some possible objections.
4.1 Ryle on Carroll Paradox
Ryle considers an alleged possibility of propositional reduction in the following
form:
[K]nowing how to reason was assumed to be analyzable into the
knowledge or supposal of some propositions, namely, (1) the special
1Such a reduction in different contexts, mostly linguistic, was pursued and claimed to
be obtained by other authors [26, 4].
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premisses, (2) the conclusion, plus (3) about the implication of
the conclusion by the premisses. ([24], p. 6-7)
He rejects this possibility by pointing to an infinite regress known as Carroll
Paradox [3]: in order to obtain the conclusion (2) from premisses (1) and
(3) one needs to apply a new rule R1 (modus ponens); a similar attempted
reduction of knowing R1 requires knowing a new rule R2 and so on ad
infinitum. If we assume that Ryle refers here to a Hilbertian framework with
Deduction Property:
(DP) : A ` B if and only if ` A→ B
then this regress can be presented as follows:
A ` B if and only if ` A→ B
A,A→ B ` B if and only if A ` (A→ B)→ B
A, (A → B) → B ` B if and only if A ` ((A → B) → B) → B
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
where each application of DP increases the number of implication signs in
each formula by one. Clearly this procedure does not allow for replacement
of rule A ` B by proposition A→ B. Here we are wholly with Ryle.
Ryle’s further remarks that
[K]nowing . . . a rule [of logical inference] is not a case of knowing
an extra fact or truth ; it is knowing how to move from acknowledging
some facts to acknowledging others. ([24], p. 7)
This time his claim is inconsistent with our claim according to which knowing
rule A ` B reduces to knowing inference A |= B interpreted after Tarski as
proposition SCA|=B. Indeed, SCA|=B (and hence A |= B) is a description of a
state of affairs, which doesn’t involve anything like a “move” from premisses to
conclusion. In this semantics framework the very name of “rule of inference”
is, strictly speaking, oxymoronic or at leas incoherent. In this framework the
idea of reasoning as an action in time, which comprises earlier steps and
later steps and is a subject of certain rules, is relevant only to the syntax:
rule A ` B and all symbolic manipulations, which are subject to this rule, is
nothing but a partial symbolic representation of the relation A |= B, which
is a fact of the matter. One may still argue that knowing how to manipulate
with symbols according to syntactic rules requires a skill, which does not
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necessarily belong to one’s knowledge of A |= B, and which may help one
to come to knowing A |= B. But even if one agrees with these claims they
hardly constitute a strong objection to the thesis of epistemic reducibility
of knowing-how to knowing-that because in this semantic framework the
symbolic skills have only an auxiliary role and no independent epistemic
value. So we get here a version of Platonic epistemology where practical
skills are subsumed to the knowledge of truth.
4.2 Further Objections
Let us now consider some other possible objections to the proposed reduction.
SCA|=B is not a theorem of the same theory T where A ` B belongs. SCA|=B
belongs to the model theory MT of T . One may argue that this opens an
infinite regress: in order to know a theory one needs to know another theory
and so on. One may also argue that in order to make use of SCA|=B one
needs to apply certain logical rules at the meta-theoretical level, which once
again opens Carroll’s infinite regress in a new form. In order to block such
objections one should not think of MT as a theory on equal footing with T ;
in fact our argument doesn’t require that MT has any deduction structure at
all. We can describe the proposed propositional reduction in a clearer form
by replacing the usual syntactic notion of theory T by a semantic conception
of theory TS which extends the syntax of T with a single symbol |= and rule
(`|=) : A ` B` A |= B ;
at the semantic level MT comprises all models of T . Expressions of form
A |= B stand in TS for propositions SCA|=B. Such expressions are sterile in
the sense that they cannot be used in derivations along with usual formulas
(the use of syntactic rules in TS is restricted accordingly); their sole role is
to make explicit the model-theoretic semantics of derivations. We allow TS
to comprise true sentences of form Γ |= B (and, in particular, |= B : Go¨del
sentences) when T does not provide corresponding derivations A ` B (` B).
So we have a theory and its rudimentary model theory in one pocket. The
reduction of knowing rules to knowing propositions along the above lines
proceeds in TS without referring to any other theory. Arguably Hilbert in
1899 had a similar concept of theory in his mind [11].
Thus we submit that Tarski’s truth-conditional semantic conception of
logical consequence provides a conceptual reduction of logical knowledge-
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how, i.e., knowledge how to make logical inferences, to propositional knowledge-
that. But this claim does not imply that Ryle was wrong saying that knowing
how to make logical inferences does not reduce to propositional knowledge.
He likely would not accept Tarski’s concept of logical consequence and insist
that the concepts of rule and rule-following are fundamental in logic and
in reasoning. The above quote from Ryle suggests that he has rather an
inferentialist conception of logical consequence in his mind. Thus the above
analysis does not solve the epistemological problem but allows us to locate it
properly. What is at stake in the debate on knowing-how and knowing-that
as far as it concerns logic is the conception of logical consequence rather than
anything else.
4.3 Two Conceptions of Logical Consequence and Their
Epistemological Implications
The model-theoretic conception of logical consequence has a number of features,
which makes it vulnerable to an epistemological critique. Prawitz argues that
it involves a form of circularity and is uninformative ([22], p. 67-68). A part
of the problem is that the extension of expression “all models of theory T ”
is not precisely defined. Should one think here only about the “real world
models” developed in natural sciences, models borrowed from other parts
of mathematics or models built with metaphysical speculations about the
ultimate “logishe Aufbau der Welt”? If one determines some domain D of
all possible models of T using another theory S then the above semantic
construction of TS is no longer self-sustained because now its semantic part is
essentially determined by theory S (which, generally, cannot be incorporated
into TS as above on pain of inconsistency). In that case a critic who argues
that the model-theoretic conception of logical consequence opens a regress
appears to be right. There are two ways of preventing this regress from
being infinite. One option, is to give theory S an exceptional epistemic
status of being the universal theory of most general features of the world
(or even of all possible worlds). The traditional name of a theory, which
may fit this description, is metaphysics. Another option is to diversify one’s
concept (but not the general conception, which remains model-theoretic in
all such versions) of logical consequence by making it dependent on S. In this
way one can conceive of, for example, of Quantum Logic as an interpreted
logical calculus (or a family of such calculi), which represents symbolically
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the corresponding special semantic notion of logical consequence that draws
on Quantum Physics.
All these versions of the model-theoretic conception of logical consequence
have their supporters. But observe that they share this common feature:
they leave the idea of an epistemic act (such as acknowledgement, rejection,
verification, falsification or questioning a proposition) outside of logic proper
and place it into the disciplinary domains of Psychology, Sociology and other
disciplines, which study the “context of discovery”. This is a reason why one
who believes that the concept of epistemic act is fundamental in epistemology
and regards logic as a normative discipline that tells one how to perform
such acts properly, is not willing to accept the model-theoretic conception
of logical consequence in any of its various versions. And she does not need
to do that because the proof-theoretic semantics (PTS) provides a viable
alternative approach, which accords with her epistemological expectations.
Like the model-theoretic approach the PTS approach exists both in formal
and informal pre-mathematical versions. The informal version of PTS due
to Martin-Lo¨f involves a meaning explanation, which proceeds in a natural
language but can be also translated into a computer code in the form of
a program compiler [19]. So the meaning explanation makes explicit the
computational content of the given syntax in a form, which is understandable
for human or acceptable for machine (in the sense that it translates the given
syntax into a series of executable commands).
A formal meaning explanation uses an extra theory M for explaining the
meaning of symbolic expressions in the target theory T . From a formal point
of view nothing prevents one from using for this purpose a theory M , which
interprets rules in T in terms of appropriate truth-conditions [28]. This brings
one back to a version of model-theoretic conception of logical consequence
in T . In this case the resulting logical semantics does not any longer qualify
as PTS as described in Section 2 above. In order to avoid this conceptual
confusion it would be reasonable, in our view, to reserve the term “meaning
explanation” to PTS-type semantics and stick to the standard terminology
in model-theoretic approaches.
Thus even if recent advances in logical semantics do not allow us to resolve
the epistemological debate on knowing-how and knowing-that, they provide
certain means for representing knowing-how (in logic) without reducing it to
a variety of knowing-that. This comprises not only syntactic means, which
help to represent knowing-how in the form of syntactic rules but also semantic
means such as PTS, which provides this syntax with a procedural semantics.
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5 Constructive Theories
The explicit form of knowing-how, i.e., knowing how to follow certain formal
rules, is not limited to logic. In this Section we extend our analysis beyond the
“logical” knowing-how, i.e., knowing how to make logical inferences. Notice
that in the preceding part of the paper we did not apply any formal criterion
of logicality. The syntactic part of our above analysis did not involve anything
(except some traditional names), which made it specific to logic. Now we shall
consider some non-logical interpretations of the same or similar syntactic
constructions. For a suggestive example, which demonstrates this approach,
think of Kolmogorov’s calculus of problems CP [17]. Syntactically CP is
identical to the standard intuitionistic propositional logic but has a different
intended semantics (known as BHK semantics). This semantics is not logical
or at least not logical in a narrow sense of the word: formulae represent here
problems rather than propositions. Following [23] we call hereafter formal
theories, which comprise rules for non-propositional objects, constructive
theories.
5.1 Constructive Deduction Theorem
Let T be a Hilbertian theory. We associate now with T a typed sequential
calculus CT , which is more apt to standard PTS-style constructive interpretations
than the sequential calculus TG from Section 3.3 above. We prove the deductive
equivalence between T and CT (Lemma 12) and, finally, prove for CT a
“constructive version” of Deduction Theorem (Theorem 13), which gives us
some insights about extra-logical forms of knowing-how.
Definition 11 CT comprises:
• Types of CT are all formulae of T ;
• With each axiom A of T associate constant cA, which we interpret as
the trivial derivation of A in T . In the cases of axioms (KA,B) and (SA,B)
we use the established notation and denote the corresponding constants
as kA→(B→A) and s(A→(B→C))→((A→B)→(A→C)) omitting the upper index
when this cannot cause a confusion.
• Terms of CT correspond to derivations in T ; these terms are built from
variables and constants with a single binary operation (multiplication),
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which is an application of ruleMP . Each such term determines a unique
binary tree such that its internal nodes are marked by MP and its
leaves (??) correspond either to T -derivations of axioms or to variables.
Rules of CT specify when this tree is the correct tree of derivation from
hypotheses in T .
• Sequences of CT are expressions of form
x1:F1, . . . , xn:Fn ` t:F,
where x1, . . . xn are mutually different variables, F1, . . . Fn, F are types
(formulae) and t is a term. Sequences determine the same trees but
comprise an additional markup: they put label F to the root and attach
mark Fi to each leave xi , which signifies that xi is a variable over
derivations of formula Fi). The obtained tree can get new isolated nodes
marked by variables, which are not elements of term t; leaves, which
are not in the list x1, . . . xn may remain unmarked.
• Axioms and rules of CT :
– x1:F1, . . . , xn:Fn ` cA:A, where A is an axiom of T ??,
– x1:F1, . . . , xn:Fn ` xi :Fi,
–
x1:F1, . . . , xn:Fn ` u: (F → G) x1:F1, . . . , xn:Fn ` v:F
x1:F1, . . . , xn:Fn ` (u · v):G
.
Lemma 12 Every derivable sequence x1 : F1, . . . , xn : Fn ` t : F in CT
corresponds to a unique derivation F1, . . . Fn ` F in T. Each derivation
F1, . . . Fn ` F in T corresponds to a unique term t such that its associated
sequence x1:F1, . . . , xn:Fn ` t:F is derivable in CT .
Proof : Induction by derivations.
Remark: When variable xi is not an element of t the introduction and the
elimination of declaration xi : Fi to/from the given context does not affect
the derivability of the sequence. These operations correspond to introduction
and elimination of hypothesis, which is not used in the derivation.
Theorem 13 (“Constructive” Deduction Theorem or CDP) If sequence x1:
F1, . . . , xn:Fn, x:F ` t :G is derivable in CT , then there exists term u such
that sequence x1:F1, . . . , xn:Fn ` u: (F → G) is also derivable.
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Proof: This follows immediately from Lemma 12 and the standard Deduction
Theorem. In Appendix 1 we provide a direct proof, which is instructive
because it makes explicit the computational content of Theorem 13.
The standard PTS-style constructive reading of Theorem 13 is as follows:
if in the given context one is in a position to produce from a given token x
of type F a new token t of type G then one is also in a position to produce
in the same context a token u of type F → G, i.e., a method of producing
tokens of G from tokens of F . In this framework “method” u is an object on
equal footing with tokens of other types such as F and G. Here is a dummy
example: if one knows how to produce porridge from oat one also knows how
to produce a method of cooking porridge from oat - say, in the form of written
recipe. This property of Hilbertian systems can be very useful in applications
but at the same it would be unreasonable to expect that everyone who knows
how to cook porridge also knows how how to write cooking books!
5.2 Tacit Knowledge Revisited
The constructive Deduction Property sheds some light on the issue of the
allegedly “tacit” character of knowing-how in many practical examples such
as that of riding a bicycle. So far we called knowledge-how explicit when
it involved knowing certain explicitly written rules. Let us now change this
vocabulary and assume for the sake of the argument that in a given symbolic
calculus, which is supposed to represent some bulk of knowledge, all syntactic
rules are hidden from view while all its formulae (words) are observable. Let
us now call one’s knowing of rule
Γ, v :V ` w :W
explicit only if it translates into the the form
u : (V → W )
(in the sense that the given calculus is Hilbertian and hence Γ, v :V ` w :W
entails Γ ` u : (V → W ); otherwise we call this knowledge tacit . Using these
terms we shall now call tacit one’s knowledge how to cook porridge if this
person is unable to write a recipe, and call the same knowledge-how explicit
if this person also has this extra capacity. At the syntactic level the difference
between the two forms of knowing-how corresponds to the difference between
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the calculi, which do have and do not have the Deduction Property. We can
see no good reason to expect that all symbolic calculi, which represent certain
useful knowledge-how in the form of system of rules, have the Deduction
Property. In Appendix 2 we give an example of a useful calculus without this
property.
5.3 Which Rules are Logical?
Let us now come back to the question of whether or not a non-logical
knowledge-how can be reduced to knowledge-that. In the last Section we
have seen that the task cannot be completed by reducing the number of rules
to minimum; we have also seen that it can be completed (if one seeks for a
conceptual rather than a formal reduction) with Tarski’s semantic conception
of logical consequence. This suggests the following strategy for the non-
logical case. Given symbolic calculus C interpreted in certain constructive
terms, first, translate it syntactically into a Hilbertian form CH and, second,
interpret the single syntactic rule of CH as usual, i.e., as the logical rule
of modus ponens. Finally use Tarski’s logical semantics as in the former
case. This strategy, if successful, reduces a given constructive theory, which
comprises rules applied to objects other than propositions, to a standard
Hilbert-style axiomatic theory, where all well-formed formulae are interpreted
as propositions and where all rules are logical rules applied to propositions.
For a historical example of such a propositional rendering of a given constructive
theory think once again of Hilbert’s semi-formal axiomatization of Euclidean
geometry, which translates Euclid’s rules (of how to produce a straight
segment and other rules) into a convenient propositional form [23]. The
obtained axiomatic theory falls under the analysis given above: as soon as one
accepts Tarski’s conception of logical consequence one’s knowledge of how to
make geometrical constructions in a strong sense reduces to a propositional
knowledge.
In Section 3.3 we have studied how Hilbert-style and Gentzen-style formal
systems translate into each other syntactically. However a propositional translation
of constructive theories, which we discuss here, involves semantics and cannot
by fully analyzed from a syntactic viewpoint. We know how standard first-
and higher-order logical calculi combine logical semantics (semantic values
of logical constants) with extra-logical semantics (interpretations of non-
logical symbols). It is important for our argument, that such a semantic
combination admitted by well-formed first-order formulae also admits the
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standard interpretation of these formulae as propositions, which accords with
the idea that the syntactic rules of the given calculus represent logical rules.
But a constructive theory (in the relevant sense of the word) comprises rules,
which are applied to extra-logical objects, such as Euclid’s rule of how to
produce a line from a given point to another given point. Let us call such
rules extra-logical rules for short. How a constructive theory can be presented
in a form of interpreted symbolic calculus where all rules are logical? We
know that in some cases constructive rules can be reasonably replaced by
appropriate first-order sentences as in Hilbert’s version of Euclidean geometry.
However no schematic semantic procedure, which reduces extra-logical rules
to logical rules and in some appropriate sense preserve semantics, is known to
the authors. Epistemological motivations and implications of such semantic
translations also need to be better understood. There is a general consensus
that Hilbert’s axiomatic presentation of Euclidean geometry, which gets rid of
Euclid’s extra-logical rules and in this way makes Euclid’s geometrical proofs
“purely logical”, somehow makes this mathematical theory more rigorous,
but the total score of epistemic gains and losses involved into this procedure
remains rather unclear. Evidently these and other related questions cannot
be answered without using a formal criterion of logicality and describing the
extra-logical semantic contents of constructive theories in more precise terms.
We leave this issue for a further research.
6 Conclusion
Following Ryle’s remark that “Knowing a rule is knowing how” [24] we
argued, on the contrary to a popular opinion, that knowing-how does not
have an intrinsically tacit character but in many cases allows for an explicit
representation in the form of formal rules. This holds both for natural languages,
which allow one to formulate rules and related deontic expressions, and formal
languages where rules are represented symbolically and play an important
role in the architecture of formal calculi. Leaving natural languages aside
we reviewed two “styles” of building formal systems one of which (Hilbert-
style) employs few rules and an many axioms while the other (Gentzen-
style) employs complex systems of rules and may use no axiom. Using some
historical indications we construed the difference between the two styles
not only syntactically but also semantically by associating Tarski’s model-
theoretic conception of logical consequence (and Model theory more generally)
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with the Hilbert-style and the proof-theoretic conception of logical consequence
(and Proof-theoretic Semantics more generally) with the Gentzen-style.
In this context we introduced a syntactic definition of Hilbertian theory
(Def. 11), which reflects and narrows the informal idea of “Hilbert-style
axiomatic theory”, and proved a lemma (Lemma 7) that says that the concept
of Hilbertian theory is co-extensional with that of theory having Deduction
Property, i.e., a theory for which the Deduction Theorem holds. The Deduction
Property is of interest in the context of epistemological discussion on knowing-
how and knowing-that because there is a sense (which has been made precise
in the paper) in which it represents rule A ` B (and, as we assume, the
associated knowledge of how to follow this rule) in the form of (knowledge
of) implication A → B. We also studied here from a syntactic viewpoint
how Hilbertian theories can be translated into sequent calculi (i.e., in the
Gentzen-style systems) and vice versa (Lemmas 9 and 10)
These preparatory steps allowed us to attack the question of whether
or not knowing-how in a reasonable sense reduces to knowing-that. First,
we considered the special case of logical knowing-how, i.e., knowing how
to make logical inferences. Our conclusion here is this: while the syntactic
translations between different forms (or “styles”) of symbolic presentations by
themselves don’t provide such a reduction, the model-theoretic conception
of logical consequence allows for seeing syntactic rules as mere symbolic
representations of the meta-theoretical propositions, in terms of which the
logical consequence is defined in this case, and in that sense provides the
wanted reduction. (A purported syntactic reduction, which relies on the
Deduction Property and represents inferences as implication does not complete
the task at the pain of Carroll Paradox). This does not resolve the epistemological
problem but shows that in the chosen framework it concerns the conception
of logical consequence rather than syntactic details. The alternative proof-
theoretic conception, which we consider in this paper, does not allow for a
similar reduction of knowing-how to knowing-that and make the concepts of
rule and rule-following (and hence also the concept of knowing-how) indispensable.
This conclusion not only sheds a new light on the old epistemological debate
but also reveals epistemological implications of theories of logical semantics,
which in technical works are rarely discussed explicitly and moreover systematically.
Finally we considered a more general case of rule-based knowledge-how,
which includes knowledge-how outside logic. For this purpose we proposed
a canonical translation of Hilbertian theories into typed sequential calculi,
which are apt for non-logical constructive interpretations, some of which
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have been earlier studied by other authors. For such calculi we proved the
“constructive version” of Deduction Theorem (Theorem 13) and proposed
its informal interpretation in terms of knowing-how. Answering the question
of possible propositional reduction of knowing-how to knowing-that in this
more general case requires a more nuanced formal study, which may show
how logical and non-logical semantics combine and interact in such cases. We
leave this for a further research.
As a final remark we would like to stress that formal systems, which admit
proof-theoretic semantics, are natural candidates for the role of representational
tools for the procedural knowledge. Given the importance of procedural
knowledge in the Society one may expect that such systems can have more
applications in Knowledge Representation than they have presently. There
is apparently a general bias towards the Hilbert-style approach in thinking
about knowledge and reasoning in many areas from Philosophy to Information
Engineering. However philosophical questions concerning the nature of knowing-
how are answered there is no reason to understate this type of knowledge in
the development of Knowledge Representation Systems and other relevant
applications.
Appendix 1: Direct Proof of Theorem 13
We construct term u using the induction by steps of derivation of the sequence
x1:F1, . . . , xn:Fn, x:F ` t :G.
Case 1: Axiom of the form (t : G = cA : A). Then u = kA→(F→A) · cA.
Observe that term cA contains no variable. Hence the sequence
x1:F1, . . . , xn:Fn ` cA:A
is also derivable. Then apply the rule
x1:F1, . . . , xn:Fn ` kA→(F→A): (A→ (F → A)) x1:F1, . . . , xn:Fn ` cA:A
x1:F1, . . . , xn:Fn ` (kA→(F→A) · cA): (F → A)
Case 2: Axiom of the form (t :G = xi:Fi, where x is not one of the xi).
Proceed as in Case 1; u = kFi→(F→Fi) · xi.
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Case 3: (t :G = x:F ). In this case declaration x:F cannot be eliminated
from the context because t contains x. But in this case F = G, and so the
wanted term u is a Hilbertian proof of formula F → F :
(F → ((F → F )→ F ))→ ((F → (F → F ))→ (F → F )) scheme(S...)
F → ((F → F )→ F ) scheme(K···)
(F → (F → F ))→ (F → F ) (MP )
F → (F → F ) scheme(K···)
F → F (MP )
Thus we obtain the wanted term u = (s(...) · k(...)) · k(...) where the upper
indexes are the first, the second and the forth lines of the Hilbertian derivation.
Application of the rule: By the inductive hypotheses the following sequences
are derivable:
x1:F1, . . . , xn:Fn ` v: (F → (X → G)),
x1:F1, . . . , xn:Fn ` w: (F → X).
Let u = (s(...) · v) ·w, where the type of the first factor is (F → (X → G))→
((F → X) → (F → G)). This guaranties that the product is well-typed in
the same context: the product (s(...) · v) is of type (F → X)→ (F → G) and
term u: (F → G) is as required. This completes the proof.
Appendix 2: Primal infon logic
We prove that in the implicational fragment P→ of Primal Infon logic qP
introduced by Gurevich and Neeman [8, 9] the sequent Γ ` p → p is not
derivable. Since p ` p is derivable for all p this shows that P→ does not have
the Deduction Property.
The derivability relation of the natural deduction calculus for P→ can be
defined as follows (see [1]):
(Ax)
Γ, A ` A





Γ ` B → A





Here A,B are formulas constructed from atomic ones using “→” (primal
implication) and Γ is a set of such formulas.
It has the axiom scheme (Ax) but a sequent of the form Γ ` A→ A may
be not derivable. For example, it is the case when A = p 6∈ Γ is atomic and
Γ does not contain formulas of the form
X1 → (X2 → . . . (Xn → p) . . .).2 (1)
Indeed, let p be fixed. Consider a sequent rule with the conclusion Γ ` Y
with Y of the form (1) and with Γ that does not contain formulas of the
form (1). It can be seen that some premise of the rule also has this property,
with the same p. This premise cannot be derived by (Ax), so one can apply
the same argument to it. Thus, there is no finite derivation for the sequent
Γ ` Y . In particular, the sequent Γ ` p→ p is not derivable.
System qP has a computational semantics — and in fact more than one
such semantics [1, 18] — which makes it useful in Computer Science. Under
the encryption semantic introduced by one of the authors of the present
paper [18] the lack of Deduction Property in the above fragment of qP is
interpreted as follows. The derivability of Γ ` A means that an agent who
has access to set of messages Γ has access to message A. Formula A → B
stands for message B encoded by message A, so A→ A stands for a message
encoded by itself. Given Γ, A ` A there is no reason to expect Γ ` A→ A (in
words, Γ provides access to message A→ A) unless A makes part of context
Γ to begin with.
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